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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team is continuing its effort to develop and 
implement measures to control damage from debris in the 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control 
measures a part of routine processing and operations. 
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Shuttle Mission STS-43 was launched at 11:02 a.m.. local 8/2/91 
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1.0 Summary 
The STS-43 pre-launch inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 23 July 1991. The detailed walkdown of Launch 
Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-104 Atlantis (9th flight), ET-47 (LWT-40), and B1045. There 
were no vehicle anomalies. Minor facility discrepancies were 
resolved prior to cryoload. 
The launch was scrubbed due to a failure in the SS #3 Digital 
Computer Unit (DCU). The LH2 and L02 tanks had been filled to 
100 percent (stable replenish). A post-drain walkdown of the 
SSV and the MLP revealed no significant anomalies. 
A second pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle 
vehicle was conducted on 31 July 1991. There were no vehicle 
anomalies. Minor facility discrepancies were resolved prior to 
cryo load. 
Orbiter SS #3 DCU was replaced and the vehicle was cryoloaded 
for flight on 1 August 1991. During the topping phase of 
hydrogen tanking, leak detectors 23 and 25 showed a reading of 
20,000 ppm hydrogen in the GUCP cavity purge. The leakage did 
not violate the Launch Commit Criteria of 4 percent maximum 
concentration. A facility IPP. was taken against a liquid oxygen 
leak inside the L02 TSM. The IPR was not a constraint for 
launch. There were no ET ice or debris conditions outside of 
the established data base. Light condensate, but no ice or 
frost, was present on the acreage areas of the External Tank. 
Five Ice/Frost Team observation/ anomalies were documented and 
found acceptable for launch per the LCC and NSTS-08303. The LH2 
umbilical leak sensor detected no significant hydrogen during 
the cryoload. The tubing was successfully removed from the 
vehicle with no TPS contact or damage. 
The second launch attempt was scrubbed due to unacceptable RTLS 
weather conditions. The LH2 and L02 tanks had been filled to 
100 percent (stable replenish). A post-drain walkdown of the 
SSV and the MLP revealed no significant anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 2 August 1991. One 
hour into cryo load ten to fifteen drips With vapor trails fell 
from the aft part of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical -to-recirculation 
line interface area. There was no evidence of a blowing leak, 
nor did the drips appear for a consistent, frequent, or 
extended duration. The drips fell below the field of view 
before completely vaporizing and behaved like liquid air rather 
than hydrogen. Since that area had just chilled down due to the 
start of recirculation, the source of the cryogenic drips was 
probably a small TPS void or defect that had cryopumped locally 
for a short period of time. No more cryogenic drips occurred 
for the remainder of cryoload, stable replenish, flight 
pressurization, and launch. The recommendation made by the Ice 
Team and accepted by Launch Team Management was to document the 
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event in CMI S6444 and that no IPR was required. There was no 
violation of OMRS SOOFBO.360, which verifies no cryogenic 
leakage or excessive vapors from ET/ORB YS areas. 
During the topping phase of hydrogen tanking, leak detectors 23 
and 25 again showed a 2 percent concentration of hydrogen in 
the GUCP cavity. The leakage did not violate the Launch Commit 
Criteria of 4 percent maximum concentration. Externally, there 
was no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. 
Excessive GOX vapors again emanated from the open L02 TSM door 
and condensate was present on the walls of the TSM. A facility 
IPR with no constraint to launch was still open against a 
liquid oxygen leak inside the L02 TSM. There were no ET ice or 
debris conditions outside of the established data base. Light 
condensate, but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage 
areas of the External Tank. Five Ice/Frost Team observation/ 
anomalies were documented and found acceptable for launch per 
the LCC and NSTS-08303. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39A was performed after launch. Two 
base heat shield Q-felt plugs were found at the southwest 
corner of the pad apron. No other flight hardware or TPS 
materials were found. Launch damage to the hoiddown posts was 
minimal. EPON shim material on the south holddown posts was 
intact. The GH2 vent line had latched properly. 
A total of 146 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. Pad films confirmed a stud hang-up on HDP V. No 
ordnance fragments fell from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole. Three 
ordnance fragments fell from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole shortly 
after liftoff. One dark, thin object, possibly a frangible nut 
web or piece of firing cable, fell between the doghouse blast 
cover and the HDP #8 shoe. The new optimized frangible links 
were installed in the SRB DCS's for this mission. 
A white object fell from the aft end of the Orbiter at T+42.844 
seconds MET. The object, believed to be a section of the SSME 
closeout blanket, appeared to originate near SSME #2 and fell 
aft of the Orbiter. before being lost against the SPB plume. 
Orbiter performance, landing gear extension, wheel touchdown 
and vehicle rollout after landing was nominal. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. Both frustums exhibited no missing, TPS, but had a 
total of 84 debonds over fasteners. The field joint protection 
system closeouts were in generally good condition. The aft 
booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and 
no K5NA material was missing. HDP Debris Containment System 
(DCS) plungers were seated with the exception of HDP #2, which 
was obstructed by a frangible nut half. This was the second 
flight utilizing the optimized link. Post flight disassembly of 
the DCS housings revealed an overall system debris retention of 
C]
92 percent. The HDP #7 aft skirt bolt hole was broached along 
the hole edge closest to the centerline of the SRB. EPON shim 
material adjacent to the broached edge was missing. 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was 
conducted on August 11-12, 1991, at the Kennedy Spate Center on 
Runway 15 and in the OPF. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 
131 hits, of which 25 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 122 hits, of 
which 24 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on 
these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter 
TPS debris hits was greater than average, and the number of 
hits with a major dimension of one inch or larger was near 
average. The largest single damage site on the Orbiter lower 
surface occurred on the RH nose area below the forward RCS 
module and measured approximately 18" x 1" x 1/8" (spanned 6 
tiles). This shallow damage is typically caused by low density 
material, such as ET SOFI. 
The ET/ORB separation ordnance device plungers were seated and 
appeared to have functioned properly. SS #1 closeout blanket 
was missing numerous layers of material from 4:00 to 7:00 
o'clock (approximately 40 inches in length) and may have been 
the white object observed in films falling aft of the Orbiter 
43 seconds after launch. One piece of flight hardware was found 
on the runway beneath the L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical. A metallic 
U-shaped object, identified as a V072-565471-001 yoke, 
originated from the L02 umbilical forward inboard separation 
bolt head. 
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. The lower surface tile samples showed localized heating 
effects from re-entry. The residual samples recovered from the 
damage sites indicated tile TPS elements and a material variety 
similar to that observed in the window sample area. This data 
does not indicate a single source of damaging debris and all of 
the materials have been previously documented in post-landing 
sample reports. 
A total of ten Post Launch Anomalies, including one IFA 
candidate, were observed during this mission assessment. 
Overall, vehicle TPS subsystem performance and debris issues 
worked on the STS-43 mission were average compared to previous 
missions.
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2.0 KSC ICE/FROST/DEBRIS TEAM ACTIVITIES 
Team Composition: NASA KSC, NASA MSFC, NASA JSC, 
LSOC SPC, RI - DOWNEY, MMMSS - MAE, 
USBI - BPC, MTI - UTAH 
Team Activities: 
1) Prelaunch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objective: Identify and evaluate potential debris 
material/sources. 	 Baseline debris and 
debris sources existing from previous 
launches. 
Areas: MLP deck, ORB and SRB flame exhaust 
holes, FSS, Shuttle external surfaces 
Time: L - 1 day 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.030 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle and launch pad to identify 
and resolve potential debris sources. 
The prelaunch vehicle and pad 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Generate PR's and recommend corrective 
actions to pad managers. 
2) Launch Countdown Firing Room 2 
Objective: Evaluate ice/frost accumulation on the 
Shuttle and/or any observed debris 
utilizing OTV cameras. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 6 hours to Launch + 1 hour or 
propellant drain 
Requirements: OSD SOOFBO.005 - Monitor and video 
tape record ET TPS surfaces during 
loading through prepressurization. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: OIS call to NTD, Launch Director, and 
Shuttle managers. Generate IPR's.
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3) Ice/Frost TPS and Debris Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate any ice formation as 
potential debris material. Identify 
and evaluate any ORB, ET, or SRB TPS 
anomaly which may be a debris source 
or safety of flight concern.' Identify 
and evaluate any other possible 
facility or vehicle anomaly. 
Areas: MLP deck, FSS, Shuttle external 
surfaces 
Time: T - 3 hours (during 2 hour BIH) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.020 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall inspect 
the Shuttle for ice/frost, TPS, and 
debris anomalies after cryo propellant 
loading.	 Evaluate, document, and 
photograph all anomalies. During the 
walkdown, inspect Orbiter aft engine 
compartment (externally) for water 
condensation and/or ice formation in 
or between aft compartment tiles. An 
IR scan is required during the Shuttle 
inspection to verify ET surface temp-
eratures.	 During the walkdown inspect 
ET TPS areas which cannot be observed 
by the OTV system. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444 
Report: Briefing to NTD, Launch Director, 
Shuttle management; generate IPR's. 
4)	 Post Launch Pad Debris Inspection 
Objectives: Locate and identify debris that could 
have damaged the Shuttle during launch 
Areas: MLP zero level, flame exhaust holes 
and trenches, FSS, pad surfaces and 
slopes, extension of trenches to the 
perimeter fence, walkdown of the beach 
from Playalinda to Complex 40, aerial 
overview of inaccessible areas. 
Time: Launch + 1 hours (after pad safing, 
before washdown) 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.010 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post launch pad/area inspection to 
identify any lost flight or ground 
systems hardware and resultant debris 
sources. The post launch pad and area 
configuration shall be documented and 
photographed. 
Documents: OMI S0007, OMI S6444
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Report:	 Initial report to NTD and verbal 
briefing to Level II at L+8 hours; 
generate PR's. 
5) Launch Data Review 
Objective: Detailed review of high speed films 
video tapes, and photographs from pad 
cameras, range trackers, aircraft and 
vehicle onboard cameras to determine 
possible launch damage to the flight 
vehicle. Identify debris and debris 
sources. 
Time: Launch + 1 day to Launch + 6 days 
Requirements: OSD S00U00.011 - An engineering film 
review and analysis shall be performed 
on all engineering launch film as soon 
as possible to identify any debris 
damage to the Shuttle. Identify flight 
flight vehicle or ground system damage 
that could affect orbiter flight 
operations or future SSV launches. 
Documents: OMI S6444 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team starting on L+1 day 
through landing; generate PR's. 
6) SRB Post Flight/Retrieval Inspection 
Objective: Evaluate potential SRB debris sources. 
Data will be correlated with observed 
Orbiter post landing TPS damage. 
Areas: SRB external surfaces (Hangar AF, 
CCAFS) 
Time: Launch + 24 hours (after on-dock, 
before hydrolasing) 
Requirements: OMRSD SOOUOO.013 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post retrieval inspection 
of the SRB's to identify any damage 
caused by launch debris.
	 Anomalies 
must be documented/photographed and 
coordinated with the results of the 
post launch shuttle/pad area debris 
inspection. 
Documents: OMI B8001 
Report: Daily reports to Level II Mission 
Management Team. Preliminary report 
to SRB Disassembly Evaluation Team. 
Generate PR's.
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7) Orbiter Post Landing Debris Damage Assessment 
Objective: Identify and evaluate areas of Orbiter 
TPS damage due to debris and correlate 
if possible, source and time of 
occurrence. Additionally, runways are 
inspected for debris/sources of debris 
Areas: Orbiter TPS surfaces, runways 
Time: After vehicle safing on runway, before 
towing 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.040 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform a 
prelanding runway inspection to 
identify, document, and collect debris 
that could result in orbiter damage. 
Runway debris and any facility anomal-
ies which cannot be removed/corrected 
by the Team shall be documented and 
photographed; the proper management 
authority shall be notified and 
corrective actions taken. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.050 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
a post landing runway inspection to 
identify and resolve potential debris 
sources that may have caused vehicle 
damage but was not present or was not 
identified during pre-launch runway 
inspection. Obtain photographic 
documentation of any debris, debris 
sources, or flight hardware that may 
have been lost on landing. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.060 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall map, 
document, and photograph debris-
related Orbiter TPS damage and debris 
sources. 
Requirements: OSD SOOUOO.012 - An engineering 
debris damage inspection team shall 
perform a post landing inspection of 
the orbiter vehicle to identify any 
damage caused by launch debris. Any 
anomalies must be documented/ 
photographed and coordinated with the 
results of the post launch shuttle/ 
pad area debris inspection. 
Requirements: OMRSD V09AJO.095 - An engineering 
debris inspection team shall perform 
temperature measurements of RCC nose 
cap and RCC RH wing leading edge 
panels 9 and 17. 
Documents: OMI S0026, OMI S0027, OMI S0028
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Report:	 Briefing to NASA Convoy Commander 
and generate PR's. Preliminary 
report to Level II on the day of 
landing followed by a more detailed 
update the next day. 
8) Level II report 
Objective:	 Compile and correlate data from all 
inspections and analyses. Results 
of the debris assessment, along 
with recommendations for corrective 
actions, are presented directly to 
Level II via SIR and PRCB. Paper 
copy of complete report follows in 
3 to 4 weeks. (Ref NASA Technical 
Memorandum series) 
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3.0 SCRUB 
3.1 PEE-TEST BRIEFING 
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted on 23 July 1991 from 1200 to 1300 hours with the 
following key personnel present: 
S. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbusch NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical Systems 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
A. Biaxnonte NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
Y. Hoffman LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Mech Systems 
M. Young LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
R. Seale LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
M. Dean LSOC - SPC ET Processing, Ice Assess 
Z. Byrns NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
C. Gray MMC - MAF ET TPS & Materials Design 
S. Copsey bC - MAF ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. McClymonds RI - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
J. Stone RI - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI - LSS - Vehicle Integration 
S. Otto MMC - LSS ET Processing 
J. Worden USBI - LSS SRB Processing 
J. Cook MTI - LSS SRN Processing 
R. Hillard MTI - LSS SRN Processing
These personnel participated in various team activities, 
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and 
contributed to reports contained in this document. 
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3.2 PRE-LAUNCH SSVIPAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 23 July 1991 from 1300-1500 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and P-1 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (9th flight), ET-47 
(LWT-40), and B1045. Documentary photographs were taken of 
facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
There were no vehicle anomalies. The ET tumble valve cover was 
intact and properly configured. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryoload/ 
launch, temporary hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and LD55 were 
installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical until a permanent sensor 
could be designed and installed. The tygon tubes are intended 
to remain in place during cryogenic loading and be removed by 
the Ice Inspection Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
An MLP deck bolt south of the hydrogen dispersal system pipe 
was loose. Another deck bolt east of the RH SRB under the sound 
suppression water pipe could be freely rotated by hand. A 
platform tether with a missing cotter pin was loose on the 
northwest corner of the L02 TSM. Portable Purge Unit (PPU) 
electrical box covers at the northwest corner of the MLP were 
also loose. 
Two pneumatic line caps for the MLP high-speed camera purge 
lines were found on the deck. Paper targets and tape still 
adhered to the MLP rainbirds and north stairwell. Protective 
foam and tape were attached to four firex nozzles on the south 
side of the SSME exhaust hole. 
Cleanup of the MLP deck and pad surface was almost complete at 
the time of the inspection. Debris, such as deck scale, slag, 
safety wire, sand, and a white tie wrap, lay on the south 
hoiddown post haunches. A small piece of angle iron was visible 
on the HDP #6 haunch. K5NA trimmings were present on the HDP #1 
and #5 DCS housings, hoiddown posts, and haunch areas. 
The facility discrepancies were worked real-time or entered 
into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for resolution prior to vehicle 
tanking.
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The STS-43 stack consisted of OV-104 (9th flight),
ET-47 (LWT 40), and B1045 SRB's
C,	 i'';\	 Pc, c 
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K5NA trimmings were present on the HDP #1 and #5 DCS housings, 
hoiddown posts, and haunch areas 
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3.3 POST DRAIN INSPECTION 
The STS-43 launch was scrubbed due to a failure in the SSME #3 
controller Digital Computer Unit (DCU). The LH2 and L02 tanks 
had been filled to 100 percent (stable replenish). A post-drain 
walkdown of the SSV and the MLP was performed at Pad-39A from 
1030 to 1215 hours on 24 July 1991. 
Most of the protuberance ice that had been visible on OTV 
during cryogenic loading had melted by the time the inspection 
was performed. There was no visible TPS damage, such as divots 
or cracks, on the ET L02 tank, Intertank, or LH2 tank acreage. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on 
the -Y side of the nosecone, fairing, louver, and footprint 
area. The +Y side of the nosecone was not accessible for 
inspection. 
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact. There was no 
evidence of debonds or cracks. 
Small amounts of ice were still present in the L02 feedline 
support brackets. None of the brackets appeared to have damaged 
or loose foam. Some ice remained in all L02 feedline bellows. 
No cracks were visible in either thrust strut -to-longeron 
interfaces. A 1.5"xl" area in the +Y longeron BX-250 adjacent 
to the aft +Z depth-gage core closeout was protruding with 
1/8-inch offset. PR ET-47-TS-0020 was taken with an MRB 
approval to use-as-is based on ice acceptance criteria in 
NSTS-0 8303. 
Neither the L02 nor LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals exhibited TPS 
anomalies or unusual ice/frost accumulations. Ice fingers, 3-4 
inches in length, remained on the umbilical pyrotechnic 
canister purge vents. There was no ice or frost on the 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator access port closeout. Some ice remained 
in the LH2 feedline and recirculation line bellows. 
Ice was still present in both left and right SRB cable tray to 
upper strut fairing interfaces. EB-7 and EB-8 fittings were 
still covered with ice. 
No cause was apparent for the froth formations on the LH2 aft 
dome spray abort (sanded ring). There were no visible TPS 
anomalies on the LH2 aft dome apex and none of the SLA vents/ 
plug pull repairs were protruding. No TPS defects appeared on 
the manhole cover closeout rings (-Z cover at the -Y position 
and the +Z cover at the -Z,-Y position) where vapors had been 
observed. 
All ice formations fell within the established data base and 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303.
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No anomalies were visible on the Orbiter or SRB TPS. 
The SRB sound suppression water troughs were properly 
configured and filled with water. There were no facility 
discrepancies. The tygon tube for LD55 was not visible above 
the LH2 umbilical and had moved slightly out of position. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 4 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented vapors from the LH2 aft manhole closeout 
rings (-Y position on the -z manhole; -Y-Z position on the +Z 
manhole). No discrepancies were detected during the post drain 
inspection. 
Anomaly 002 recorded frost formations on the +Y side of the 
cable tray adjacent to the L02 feedline support bracket. 
However, comparison of this condition to the pre-cryo load 
mapping tape showed this area was a repair, not a frost spot. 
Anomaly 003 documented froth formations on the LH2 tank aft 
dome at the spray abort (sanded ring). No TPS defects were 
visible during the post drain inspection. 
Anomaly 004 recorded two frost spots on the +Y longeron BX-250 
near the aft +Z depth-gage core closeout. PR ET-47-TS-0020 was 
taken against a 1.5"xl" delamination along the foam knit line 
with 1/8-inch offset. The area was accepted by MRB approval for 
unrestricted use-as-is.
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T. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on 
the nosecone, fairing, louver, and footprint areas. 
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A 1.5"xl" area in the +Y longeron BX-250 adjacent to the aft +Z 
depth-gage core closeout protruded with 1/8-inch offset. An MRS 
approved the condition for flight based on acceptance criteria 
in NSTS-08303.
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The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical exhibited no TPS anomalies or unusual 
ice/frost formations. Some ice remained in the LH2 feedline 
bellows
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The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical exhibited no TPS anomalies or unusual 
ice/frost formations. The ice finger on the aft pyro canister 
was typical. There was no ice or frost on the 17-inch flapper 
valve actuator access port closeout. 
19	 ORGNAL PAGE 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
4.0 SUB 
4.1 PRE-LAtJNCE SSV/PP1D DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A second pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle 
vehicle was conducted on 31 July 1991 from 1300-1400 hours. The 
walkdown of Launch Pad 39A and MLP-1 also included the primary 
flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (9th flight), ET-47 (LWT-40), 
and B1045. Documentary photographs were taken of facility 
anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging debris, and 
vehicle configuration changes. 
The tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detection sensors LD 54 and 
55, which had been removed during the first launch attempt, 
were re-installed on the vehicle. 
An OIS J-pipe cover on the west side of the SSME exhaust hole 
was loose. Protective foam secured with tape covered the four 
FIREX nozzles on the south corners of the SSME exhaust hole. 
Small pieces of deck scale, paint flakes, and foam trimmings 
were present in the haunch areas and under the raised deck. The 
deck was vacuumed/washed down prior to cryoload. 
The facility discrepancies were worked real-time or entered 
into OMI S0007, Appendix K, for resolution prior to vehicle 
tanking. 
I
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Pre-cryo load view of the STS-43 stack 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORS umbilical 
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical, cable tray, 
LH2 feedline interface, and recirculation line interface 
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4.2 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was per-
formed on 1 August 1991 from 0520 to 0740 hours during the two 
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations. There 
were no conditions outside of the established data base. One 
facility IPR was taken against a LOX leak in the L02 TSM. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 78.3 F 
Relative Humidity: 91.3 % 
Wind Speed:	 10.8 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 159 Degrees 
A portable infrared radiometer was utilized to obtain surface 
temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of 
the vehicle, as shown in Figure 1 and 2. 
4.3 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. All RCS paper covers 
were wet from recent rain, but were intact. There was no 
evidence of a leak or a liquid level line on any of the RCS 
paper covers. The water spray boiler plugs were intact. The 
average Orbiter surface temperature was 74-78 degrees F. The 
average surface temperatures of the SSME engine mounted heat 
shields were measured at 73 degrees F for SS #1, 72 degrees F 
for SS #2, and 74 degrees F for SS #3. The coldest area on 
the engine mounted heat shields was less than 32 degrees F 
where frost was present at the interface. All of the SSME heat 
shields were wet with some condensate. Light frost coated the 
SS #1 heat shield-to-nozzle interface at the 8-10, 11-12, and 
3 o'clock position. Light frost also coated the SST #2 heat 
shield-to-nozzle interface at the 3-9 o'clock position. One of 
the SS #1 drain lines was covered by frost. No GOX vapors 
originated from inside the SSME nozzles. Some condensate was 
present on base heat shield tiles between SS 	 #2 and #3 and 
outboard of SS	 #2. 
4.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The Cyclops infrared radiometer recorded RH and LH SRB 
case surface temperatures between 76 and 79 degrees F. The 
Mikron IR radiometer gave measurements between 72 and 77 
degrees F. In comparison, the GEl gave readings between 78 and 
82 degrees F. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature 
(PT) supplied by MTI was 83 degrees F, which was within the 
required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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FIGURE 1 SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE

SUMMARY DATA 
TIME:	 0530 - 0730 
DATE:	 8/1/91 
VEH. STS 43 
Cyclops IR Ra 
Wet Tank e=0. 
SRB	 e=0. 
All temperatu 
in degrees F. 
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FIGURE 2. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
SUMMARY DATA 
TIME
	 0530-0730 
#3: 75 
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4.5 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SUR.FICE' was run 
from 0245 to 1230 hours and the results tabulated in Figures 3 
and 4. The program predicted condensate with no ice accumula-
tion on all TPS acreage surfaces. 
Very light condensate, but no ice or frost, was present on the 
L02 tank barrel TPS acreage. There was no ice/frost or conden-
sate on the L02 tank ogive. There were no TPS anomalies. The 
tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on the 
pressurization line and support ramps. The stationary STI unit 
on the RSS roof measured a surface temperature of 74 degrees F 
on the ogive and 72 degrees F on the barrel section. SURFICE 
predicted 71 degrees F on the ogive and 68 degrees F on the 
barrel section. The Cyclops IR radiometer measured 75 and 73 
degrees F, respectively. 
The intertank TPS acreage was wet with light run-off conden-
sate. There were no TPS anomalies. Three small frost spots 
appeared in the stringer valleys at the LH2 tank flange near 
the -z axis. No unusual ice formations or cryogenic drips were 
present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The RSS STI IR 
scanner measured an average surface temperature of 76 degrees F 
compared to a Cyclops IR radiometer measurement of 75 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
The LH2 tank and aft dome TPS acreage were covered with a 
moderate amount of condensate. There was no ice/frost on the 
acreage. The average surface temperatures as measured by the 
RSS STI IR scanner were 71 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 
72 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank compared to a Cyclops IR 
radiometer measurements of 68 and 68 degrees F, respectively. 
SURFICE predicted 67 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 66 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, jack pads, PAL ramp, 
cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, thrust struts, manhole 
covers, or aft dome apex with the exception of a small 
ice/frost spot on the -z manhole cover. The frost spot later 
melted. Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-
to-upper strut fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the 
lower EB fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with conden-
sate on the rest of, the fitting. The struts were dry. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in all L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets. 
There were no anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The purge 
barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding posi-
tive purge pressure. Small scattered accumulations of ice/frost 
were present of the outboard and aft areas of the baggie. There 
was no ice/frost accumulation on the acreage areas of the 
umbilical. Ice/frost fingers 3-6 inches in length had formed on 
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the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents. Normal 
venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost had formed in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and 
on both burst disks. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. The forward and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical were covered by typical ice/frost formations. Ice/ 
frost accumulation on the inboard and aft areas of the baggie 
was light. Ice/frost fingers 2-3 inches in length had formed on 
the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. A small amount of 
ice/frost had formed along the bondline of the aft pyro 
canister closeout (aft side), forward outboard pyro canister 
closeout (aft side), and recirculation line to umbilical 
closeout (aft side) . These ice/frost formations were acceptable 
per NSTS-08303. Normal venting of helium purge gas had occurred 
during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. There were no 
unusual vapors emanating from the umbilicals nor any evidence 
of cryogenic drips. No ice or frost was present on the cable 
tray vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port 
foam plug was properly closed out with no ice/frost on the 
bondline. Torn butcher paper on the vertical strut was accept-
able for launch and documented on an anomaly sheet. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle with no flight hardware contact or TPS damage. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 5 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 (documentation only) noted three frost spots in the 
-z stringer valleys near the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange. 
Frost spots in these locations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 002 recorded torn butcher paper for the hydrogen detec-
tion system on the -z vertical strut. The paper was still able 
to serve the intended purpose of fire detection and was accept-
able to the Debris Team. 
Anomaly 003 (documentation only) noted ice/frost formations in 
the L02 feedline bellows and brackets. These formations were 
acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 004 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
at the L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals in the areas of the purge 
barriers, separation bolt purge vents, and the LH2 umbilical 
intercavity purge vents. These formations were acceptable per 
NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 005 (documentation only) noted ice/frost accumulation 
in the LH2 feedline and recirculation line bellows. The 
accumulations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
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4.6 FACILITY 
No new debris concerns had been identified during the ice/frost 
inspection of the vehicle. 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of. ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines. Excessive GOX vapors emanated 
from the open L02 TSM door and a Launch Accessories IPR was 
taken against a suspected liquid oxygen leak inside the TSM. 
The vapors had not been present at the start of the Ice Team 
inspection on the MLP zero level but were visible when the Team 
returned to the MLP deck 90 minutes later. Condensate was 
present on the TSM walls from MLP deck level to half the height 
of the TSM. Infrared scanners measured 67 degrees F on the 
south wall of the TSM, 68 degrees on the east wall, and 68 
degrees on the door compared to an average of 75 degrees F on 
the LH2 TSM. Engineering determined the suspected LOX leak 
would not be a constraint to launch. 
During the topping phase of hydrogen tanking, leak detectors 23 
and 25 showed a rapid rise to 20,000 ppm hydrogen in the GUCP 
cavity purge. The leakage settled into an oscillatory pattern 
of 5000 ppm for a period of 7 minutes. Review of correlated ET 
purge data showed the hydrogen readings to be synchronous with 
the ET intertank (normal) purge heater cycles and the venturi 
(normal) differential pressure, which may suggest some unknown 
pressure /thermal phenomena caused the leak by distorting the 
cavity/QD. No hydrogen leakage was detected during the first 
launch attempt on 24 July 1991. Externally, there was no 
apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. The 
modification to the GH2 vent line prevented ice from forming, 
but some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the 
GUCP legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier 
plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. There were no icicles on the GOX 
vent ducts.
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There were no TPS anomalies or ice/frost accumulations on the 
External Tank acreage 
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Although leak detectors 23 and 25 showed a hydrogen leak of 
5000 ppm in the GUCP cavity purge, there were no unusual vapors 
or ice/frost formations externally. Ice/frost accumulations on 
the GUCP legs and trimmed TPS areas were typical. 
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Ice/frost accumulations in the L02 feedline support brackets 
were typical 
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Ice/frost formations in the L02 feedline bellows were typical 
35	
OY-
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
C_:;= 
FFN
A 1.5"xl" area in the +Y longeron BX-250 adjacent to the aft +Z 
depth-gage core closeout, though protruding with an 1/8-inch 
offset, formed no ice/frost during cryo load. An MRB approved 
the condition for flight based on acceptance criteria in NSTS-
08303.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumula-
tions on the umbilical outboard side and on the purge vents 
were typical. There were no unusual vapors emanating from the 
umbilical nor any evidence of cryogenic drips. Ice/frost in the 
recirculation line bellows and burst disks was typical. 
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Ice/frost accumulations on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical outboard 
side and top sides, plate gap purge vent, and forward outboard 
pyrotechnic canister purge vent were typical. A small amount of 
ice/frost had formed along the bondline of the pyro canister 
closeout (aft side) - an acceptable condition per NSTS-08303. 
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Ice/frost accumulations on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical outboard 
side and aft sides, plate gap purge vent, and aft pyrotechnic 
canister purge vent were typical. A small amount of ice/frost 
had formed along the bondline of the pyro canister closeout 
(aft side) and recirculation line to umbilical interface. Both 
conditions were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
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Overall view of SSME cluster and RH OMS nozzle 
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Excessive gaseous oxygen vapors emanated from the open door of 
the L02 TSM and a facility IPR was taken against a suspected 
liquid oxygen leak inside the TSM 
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Infrared scanners measured L02 TSM wall temperatures an average 
of 8 degrees cooler than similar places on the LH2 TSM walls. 
In addition, condensate was present on the L02 TSM walls from 
the MIJP deck level to half the height of the TSM. The launch 
team determined a liquid oxygen leak inside the TSM would not 
be a constraint to launch.
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The launch of STS-43 was scrubbed due to unacceptable RTLS 
weather conditions at the Shuttle Landing Facility 
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4.7 POST DRAIN INSPECTION 
The STS-43 launch was scrubbed due to unacceptable RTLS weather 
conditions. The LH2 and L02 tanks had been filled to 100 
percent (stable replenish). A post-drain walkdown of the SSV 
and the MLP was performed at Pad-39A from 1745 to 1930 hours on 
1 August 1991. 
Most of the protuberance ice that had been visible on OTV 
during cryogenic loading had melted by the time the inspection 
was performed. There was no visible TPS damage, such as divots 
or cracks, on the ET L02 tank, Intertank, or LH2 tank acreage. 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on 
the -Y side of the nosecone, fairing, louver, and footprint 
area. The +Y side of the nosecone was not accessible for 
inspection. 
Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact. There was no 
evidence of debonds or cracks, even though a small ice/frost 
ball had formed on each of the closeouts during LH2 drain. 
Small amounts of ice were still present in the L02 feedline 
support brackets. None of the brackets appeared to have damaged 
or loose foam. Some ice remained in all L02 feedline bellows. 
No cracks were visible in either thrust strut -to-longeron 
interfaces. The 1.5"xl" area adjacent to the thickness-check 
closeout in the aft +Z corner of the +Y longeron was still 
protruding with 1/8-inch offset. A 1"x2" piece of gray tape 
adhered to the -Y longeron approximately two feet aft of the 
thrust strut-to-longeron interface. 
Neither the L02 nor LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals exhibited TPS 
anomalies or unusual ice/frost accumulations. Ice fingers, 1-3 
inches in length, remained on the umbilical pyrotechnic 
canister purge vents. There was no ice or frost on the 17-inch 
flapper valve actuator access port closeout. Some ice remained 
in the LH2 feedline and recirculation line bellows. 
Ice was still present in both left and right SRB cable tray to 
upper strut fairing interfaces. EB-7 and EB-8 fittings were 
still covered with ice. 
The aft hard point closeout had two very small areas of 
ice/frost inside two accepted surface voids, but was otherwise 
intact. 
There were no visible TPS anomalies on the LH2 aft dome apex 
and none of the SLA vent/plug pull repairs were protruding. No 
TPS defects appeared on the manhole cover closeout rings, even 
though there was frost on the siphon cover leak check port 
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closeout and froth in two places of the manhole access cover 
(one at the leak check port closeout and one 180 degrees from 
the closeout) 
All ice formations fell within the established data base and 
were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
No anomalies were visible on the Orbiter or SRB TPS. 
The SRB sound suppression water trough third from the north in 
the LH SR-B exhaust hole was torn at the east end and was empty 
of all water. All the other water troughs were configured 
correctly. There were no other facility discrepancies. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 3 OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 006 documented a frost ball and vapors from the -Y jack 
pad closeout during drain. The frost formation fell off the 
vehicle after two minutes. Post drain inspection revealed no 
visible TPS defect. 
Anomaly 007 recorded a frost ball and vapors from the -Y bipod 
ramp during drain. The frost formation fell off the vehicle and 
the vapors stopped after two minutes. Post drain inspection 
revealed no visible TPS defect. The frost spot reappeared 
during cryogenic loading on 2 August 1991. The frost formation 
was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 008 documented a frost ball and vapors from the +Y jack 
pad closeout during drain. The frost formation fell off the 
vehicle and the vapors stopped after a few minutes. Post drain 
inspection revealed no visible TPS defect. 
45
ktrft 
The tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on 
the -Y side of the nosecone, fairing, louver, and footprint 
area. The nosecone +Y side was not accessible for inspection. 
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Both bipod jack pad closeouts were intact after cryo load 
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The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical exhibited no TPS anomalies or unusual 
ice/frost accumulations after cryo load with the exception of 
an ice/frost formation along the bondline of the forward 
outboard pyro canister closeout (aft side) . This condition was 
acceptable per NSTS-08303.
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5.0 LAUNCH 
STS-43 was launched at 2:15:01.986 GMT (11:02 a.m. local) on 
August 2, 1991. 
5.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was per-
formed on 2 August 1991 from 0555 to 0740 hours during the two 
hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria, OS, or NSTS-08303 violations. There 
were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 69.6 F 
Relative Humidity: 95.5 % 
Wind Speed:	 5.4 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 159 Degrees 
An infrared radiometer was utilized to obtain surface tempera-
ture measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the 
vehicle, as shown in Figure 5 and 6. 
5.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile anomalies were observed. All RCS paper covers 
were wet or dry after being wet. The covers were intact and 
attached to the thrusters. There was no evidence of a leak or a 
liquid level line on any of the RCS paper covers. The water 
spray boiler plugs were intact. The average Orbiter surface 
temperature was 75 degrees F. The average surface temperatures 
of the SSME engine mounted heat shields were measured at 69 
degrees F for SS #1, 70 degrees F for SS #2, and 73 degrees 
F for SS #3. All of the SSME heat shields were wet with some 
condensate. Light frost coated the SSME #1 heat shield-to-
nozzle interface at the 2-7 o'clock position and the SS #2 
heat shield-to-nozzle interface at the 2-10 o'clock position. 
One of the SSME drain lines on SSME #2 was covered by frost. No 
GOX vapors originated from inside the SSME nozzles. Some 
condensate was present on base heat shield tiles between SSME 
#2 and #3 and outboard of SS #2. 
5.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The Cyclops infrared radiometer recorded RH and LH SRB 
case surface temperatures between 76 and 79 degrees F. The 
Mikron IR radiometer gave measurements between 72 and 76 
degrees F. In comparison, the GEl gave readings between 78 and 
82 degrees F. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature 
(PMBT) supplied by MTI was 83 degrees F, which was within the 
required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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FIGURE 5. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE

SUMMARY DATA 
FIGURE 6. SSV INFRARED SCANNER 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
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5.4 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0330 to 1100 hours and the results tabulated in Figures 7 
and 8. The program predicted condensate with no ice accumula-
tion on all TPS acreage surfaces. 
Very light condensate, but no ice or frost, was present on the 
L02 tank barrel TPS acreage. There was no ice/frost or conden-
sate on the L02 tank ogive. There were no TPS anomalies. The 
tumble valve cover was intact. There were no anomalies on the 
pressurization line and support ramps. The stationary STI unit 
on the RSS roof measured a surface temperature of 74 degrees F 
on the ogive and 69 degrees F on the barrel section. SUR.FICE 
predicted 68 degrees F on the ogive and 63 degrees F on the 
barrel section. The Cyclops IR radiometer measured 74 and 72 
degrees F, respectively. 
The intertank TPS acreage was wet with light run-off conden-
sate. There were no TPS anomalies. Numerous small scattered 
frost spots appeared in the stringer valleys at both LH2 and 
L02 tank -z flanges. Vapors emanated from three of the frost 
spots. No cryogenic drips or unusual ice formations were 
present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The RSS STI infrared 
scanner measured an average surface temperature of 75 degrees F 
compared to a Cyclops IR radiometer measurement of 76 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
The LH2 tank and aft dome TPS acreage were covered with a 
moderate amount of condensate. There was no ice/frost on the 
acreage. The average surface temperatures as measured by the 
RSS STI IR scanner were 69 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 
72 degrees F on the lower LH2 tank compared to a Cyclops IR 
radiometer measurement of 70 and 68 degrees F, respectively. 
SURFICE predicted 53 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 67 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, jack pads, PAL ramp, 
cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, thrust struts, manhole 
covers, or aft dome apex with the exception of a small 
ice/frost spot at +Z manhole cover plug repair, a frost line on 
the -Y longeron, and a small frost spot on the aft surface of 
the +Y bipod closeout. The +Y longeron exhibited a frost spot 
along a knit line (no crack in the TPS), but no ice or frost 
was present on the area that had previously delaminated. Some 
ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper strut 
fairing expansion joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB 
fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the 
rest of the fitting. The struts were dry. 
Typical amounts of hard, crusty ice were present in all L02 
feedline bellows and support brackets. 
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There were no anomalies on the L02 ET/ORBuxnbilical. The purge 
barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding posi-
tive purge pressure. Small scattered accumulations of ice/frost 
were present of the outboard and aft areas of the baggie. There 
was no ice/frost accumulation on the acreage areas of the 
umbilical. Ice/frost fingers 4 inches in length had formed on 
the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents. Normal 
venting of nitrogen purge gas had occurred during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost had formed in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and 
on both burst disk areas. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet 
with condensate. The forward and outboard sides of the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical were covered by typical ice/frost formations. 
Ice/ frost accumulation on the inboard and aft areas of the 
baggie was light. Typical ice/frost fingers had formed on the 
pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. A small amount of 
ice/frost had formed along the bondline of the aft pyro 
canister closeout (aft side), forward outboard pyro canister 
closeout (aft side), and recirculation line to umbilical 
closeout (aft side) . These ice/frost formations were acceptable 
per NSTS-08303. No ice or frost was present on the cable tray 
vent hole. The 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam 
plug was properly closed out with no ice/frost on the bondline. 
Normal venting of helium purge gas had occurred during tanking, 
stable replenish, and launch. 
One hour into cryo load (T-4:57:54 through T-4:56:36) ten to 
fifteen drips with vapor trails fell from the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical-to-recirculation line interface area. There was no 
evidence of a blowing leak, nor did the drips appear for a 
consistent, frequent, or extended duration. The drips fell 
below the field of view before completely vaporizing and 
behaved like liquid air rather than hydrogen. Since that area 
had just chilled down due to the start of recirculation, the 
source of the cryogenic drips was a small TPS void or defect 
that had cryopumped locally for a short period of time. No more 
cryogenic drips occurred for the remainder of cryoload, stable 
replenish, flight pressurization, and launch. The recommenda-
tion made by the Ice Team and accepted by the Launch Team 
Management was to document the event in OMI S6444 and that no 
IPR was required. There was no violation of OS SOOFBO.360, 
which verifies that there was no cryogenic leakage or excessive 
vapors from the ET/ORB MPS areas. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing had not been 
re-installed on the vehicle due to the 24 hour scrub turnaround 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations /anomalies consisted 
of 5 OTV recorded items:
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Anomaly 009 documented ice/frost formations and vapors on the 
+Y longeron forward of a previously accepted area (ref PR ET-
47-TS-0020). The formation appeared to be the result of a TPS 
defect and was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 010 documented localized cryopumping from the LH2 
ET/ORB umbilical to LH2 recirculation line interface from T - 
4:57:54 through 4:56:55 and T-4:56:42 through 4:56:36. The Ice 
Team assessed the condition and determined the cryogenic drips 
were liquid air produced by exposure to a cryogenic surface due 
to a localized TPS defect, such as a void or cracked bondline. 
The drips fell too far before vaporizing to be anything but 
liquid air. The dripping liquid did not represent a leak from 
any cryogenic component. 
Anomaly 011 noted ice/frost spots (some with vapors) at the LH2 
tank-to-intertank flange on the -z side of the tank. The vapors 
were not excessive. These frost spots were acceptable per 
NSTS-0 8303. 
Anomaly 012 recorded a small ice/frost formation at the 
junction of the -Y longeron clip, vertical ET/SRB cable tray, 
and -Y PAL ramp. The frost formed along a bondline and was 
acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 013 (documentation only) noted ice/frost accumulations 
in the L02 feedline brackets and bellows, L02 ET/ORB umbilical 
purge vent and baggie, LH2 feedline and recirculation line 
bellows, and LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vent and baggie. All 
areas were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
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5.5 FACILITY 
No new debris concerns had been identified during the ice/frost 
inspection of the vehicle. 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines. One corner of the purge barrier 
in the LH2 TSM door had come loose. Excessive GOX vapors again 
emanated from the open L02 TSM door and condensate was present 
on the walls of the TSM. The infrared devices measured 62 
degrees F on the south wall of the TSM compared to a reading of 
74 degrees F at a similar location on the LH2 TSM. A Launch 
Accessories IPR taken during the previous cryo load was still 
open against a suspected liquid oxygen leak inside the TSM. 
Internal inspection of the L02 TSM during the 24 hour scrub 
turnaround revealed no obvious anomalies. The IPR was no 
constraint for launch. 
Post launch troubleshooting consisted of pressurizing the 
system with helium and a mass spec leak check of the joints. A 
large leak was detected at the 2-inch fill and drain vent line 
at the top of the TSM masthead where the line transitions from 
flexhose to hardline (KC union and "B" nuts) . Two other minor 
leaks were detected at the 1/4-inch pressure monitor line for 
the 8-inch fill and drain line at the top of the masthead and 
at the 3/4-inch drain assist purge line for the 8-inch fill 
line at the bathtub bulkhead "B" nut. The 2-inch union and all 
seals at the three joints were replaced. All MLP-3 LOX TSM 
fittings that will encounter cryogenic loading during STS-48 
will be torque and leak checked. 
During the topping phase of hydrogen tanking, leak detectors 23 
and 25 showed a rapid rise to 20,000 ppm hydrogen in the GUCP 
cavity purge. The leakage settled into an oscillatory pattern 
of 3000-4000 ppm and was similar to the previous cryo load. 
Externally, there was no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 
vent line or GUCP. The modification to the GH2 vent line 
prevented ice from forming, but some ice/frost, which was 
expected, had accumulated on the GtJCP legs and on the uninsu-
lated parts of the umbilical carrier plate. 
Post launch examination of the GUCP revealed the loading nut, 
which controls load on the bellows, was in a configuration that 
reduced the load between the bellows probe and the seal. This 
condition combined with liquid hydrogen carry over into the 
vent line during topping could cause a leak. In addition, the 
3/8-inch QD seal supports for the nose cone and intertank 
purges were installed in the wrong location. The problem 
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appeared to be caused by procedures rather than a hardware 
problem. Subsequent vehicles will be inspected to verify proper 
configuration. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. There were no icicles on the GOX 
vent ducts.
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The STS-43 stack was cryo loaded for flight on 8/2/91.
There were no Orbiter tile or SBB anomalies. 
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Overall view of the SSME cluster and RH OMS nozzle. Some ice/ 
frost had accumulated at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-
nozzle interfaces.
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Very light condensate, but no ice or frost, was present on the 
L02 tank barrel TPS acreage. There was no ice/frost or conden-
sate on the L02 tank ogive. There were no TPS anomalies. 
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The intertank TPS acreage was wet with run-off condensate. 
There were no TPS anomalies. Numerous small scattered frost 
spots appeared in the stringer valleys at both LH2 and L02 tank 
-z flanges - an acceptable condition per NSTS-08303. 
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The LH2 tank and aft dome TPS acreage were covered with a 
moderate amount of condensate. There were no TPS anomalies or 
ice/frost accumulations on the acreage. 
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Typical amounts of hard, crusty ice were present in all 
L02 feedline bellows and support brackets 
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A small frost spot formed along a knit line (no crack in the 
TPS) on the +Y longeron, but no ice or frost was present on the 
area that had previously delaminated (arrow) 
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There were no anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical 
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Atmospheric conditions (high humidity) caused condensate to 
drip from the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical onto Orbiter tiles. Normal 
venting of cold helium purge gas, more visible than usual, 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
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One hour into cryo load, 15 drips with vapor trails fell from 
the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical-to-recirculation line interface area. 
There was no evidence of a blowing leak, nor did the drips 
appear for a consistent, frequent, or extended duration. The 
drips behaved like liquid air rather than hydrogen. Since that 
area had just chilled down due to the start of recirculation, 
the source of the cryogenic drips was a small TPS void or 
defect that had cryopumped locally for a short period of time. 
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Excessive vapors again emanated from the open door of the L02 
TSM due to a liquid oxygen leak inside the TSM. The leak was 
not a constraint to launch. Post launch assessment revealed a 
large leak at the top of the TSM masthead where the line 
transitioned from flexhose to hardline. 
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6.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, pad surface, and 
pad acreage was performed on August 2-3, 1991. Two base heat 
shield Q-felt plugs were found at the southwest corner of the 
pad apron. No other flight hardware or TPS materials were 
found. 
Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. All 
EPON shim sidewall material and shim bottom plate material was 
intact and bonded to the shoes. There was no visual indication 
of a stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown posts. North 
holddown post doghouse blast covers were in the closed position 
and exhibited typical plume erosion.. HDP #4 doghouse blast 
cover had two holes, the largest measuring 3"xl". The SRB aft 
skirt. purge lines were in place but slightly damaged. One 
connector saver (sacrificial piece) on the RH SRB T-0 umbilical 
protruded upward 0.75 inches. The other cable connector savers 
on both SRB T-0 umbilicals were in place and showed normal 
plume impingement effects. 
The OAA and TSM's showed the usual minor post launch damage. 
The Hydrogen Dispersal System structure was undamaged. The GOX 
vent arm was locked in the retracted position and exhibited 
minor launch damage. The GOX vent hood west window was detached 
at one corner. The GH2 vent arm appeared to have retracted 
nominally, was latched on the eighth tooth of the latching 
mechanism, and had no loose cables. The ET intertank access 
structure sustained typical plume heating effects. 
Typical damage to the facility included 1) four FSS level signs 
detached from the west side of the elevator shaft, 2) a panel 
detached between elevator doors on the 115' level, 3) cabinet 
doors were ajar and bent, 4) one cable tray cover was found 100 
yards east of the pad, and 5) one of nine light fixtures from 
an east stadium light was detached and found east of the pad. 
No emergency egress slidewire baskets had released during 
launch. 
Inspection of the pad perimeter was completed on 3 August 1991 
along with the areas outside the pad perimeter, railroad 
tracks, the beach from UCS-9 to the Atlas complex, the beach 
access road, and the ocean areas under the vehicle flight path. 
No flight hardware was found. 
Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 46 particles 
were imaged in the T+143 to 424 second time period. Thirty-one 
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of the particles were imaged by only one radar, 13 particles 
were imaged by two radars, and 2 particles were imaged by all 
three radars.' Signal returns for the particles were in the same 
range that has become typical for previous missions. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in' Section 11. 
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Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. All 
EPON shim sidewall material and shim bottom plate material was 
intact and bonded to the shoes. There was no visual indication 
of a stud hang-up on any of the south hoiddown posts. 
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North HDP blast covers were in the closed position and 
exhibited typical plume erosion effects 
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Post launch condition of SRB T-O umbilical 
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7.0 FILM REVIEW AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
A total of 146 film and video data items, which included 49 
videos, 61 16mm films, 31 35mm films, five 70mm films; and 
seventeen on-orbit still frames, were reviewed starting on 
launch day. 
No Problem Reports or IFA's were generated as a result of the 
film and video reviews. Post Launch Anomalies observed in the 
reviews were presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle 
managers, and vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are 
listed in Section 11. 
7.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
No major vehicle' damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
One hour into cryo load (T-4:57:54 through T-4:56:36) ten to 
fifteen drips with vapor trails fell from the aft part of the 
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical (LH2 recirculation line interface) and 
appeared to originate from the area of the ice/frost formation 
along this interface (OTV 009, 063). There was no evidence of a 
blowing leak, nor did the drips appear for a consistent, 
frequent, or extended duration. The drips fell below the field 
of view before completely vaporizing and behaved like liquid 
air rather than hydrogen. Since that area had just chilled down 
due to the start of recirculation, the source of the cryogenic 
drips probably was a small TPS void or defect that had 
cryopumped locally for a short period of time. No more 
cryogenic drips occurred for the remainder of cryoload, stable 
replenish, and flight pressurization. Helium purge vapors and 
ice build-up on the LH2 umbilical had been typical. There were 
no unusual vapors or cryogenic drips during liftoff. 
SSME gimbal profile appeared normal. Free burning hydrogen was 
blown under the body flap by southerly winds (OTV 051, 063, 
070, 071) . Numerous flashes and discolorations, possibly caused 
by contaminants, occurred in the SSME #2 Mach diamond during 
ignition (OTV 070, E-2). Orange streaks, typically caused by 
debris, were visible on the edge of the SSME #1 plume (E-3, 19, 
20) . Numerous orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during 
ascent (E-207, 212, 223) . 
The closeout blanket around SSME #2 was pulled loose or torn 
along the outer perimeter at the 11 o'clock position. The 
separation was approximately 10 inches in length and occurred 
during SSME ignition (E-24).
76
SSME ignition acoustics /vibration caused ice to fall from the 
L02 and LH2 ET/ORB umbilicals. One piece hit the umbilical 
cavity sill and was deflected outward (E-25). No tile damage 
was visible. Two pieces of ice from the L02 feedline upper 
bellows and one piece from the L02 feedline support bracket at 
station 1377 fell aft without impacting Orbiter tiles (E-5, 
25). SSME ignition acoustics/vibration caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from one location on the base heat 
shield near SS #2, two locations on the base heat shield near 
SS #3 (E-23), two locations near the LH OMS nozzle (E-19, 
24), six locations near the RH OMS nozzle, and one place from 
the body flap +Z side (E-17). 
The Orbiter T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly. 
The liquid oxygen leak in the L02 TSM had no effect on discon-
nect and retraction of the carrier plate (OTV 049, 054). 
Separation of the GUCP from the External Tank was nominal. The 
GH2 vent arm retracted and latched properly. There was no 
excessive slack in the static retract lanyard. (OTV 004, OTV 
013, E-31, 33, 41, 42, 50) 
Film items E-11 and 28 confirmed a stud hang-up on HDP V. The 
stud did not begin to drop into the holddown post until the aft 
skirt passed the doghouse blast cover. The stud rocked slightly 
from side to side after clearing the aft skirt stud hole. The 
stud pulled loose EPON shim material, three small pieces 
adjacent to the stud hole, from the aft skirt foot. No ordnance 
fragments fell from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole. Closure of the 
doghouse blast cover was not affected by the stud hang-up. 
Three ordnance fragments fell from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole 
shortly after liftoff (E-8). One dark, thin object, possibly a 
frangible nut web or piece of firing cable, fell between the 
doghouse blast cover and the HDP #8 shoe (E-14). The new 
optimized frangible links were installed in the SRB DCS's for 
this mission. 
Numerous particles were ejected out of the SRB exhaust holes 
after T-0. Many film and video items recorded various amounts 
of flying debris on and around the pad after the vehicle 
cleared the tower. This debris is SRB throat plug material and 
shredded sound suppression water troughs, which is an expected 
occurrence. 
The MLP-1 deck southwest rainbird did not activate at T-O. No 
water was visible exiting the rainbird as the vehicle cleared 
the tower and SRB plume obscured the rainbird. (E-4, 31, 60) 
A white object fell from the aft end of the Orbiter at T+42.844 
seconds MET in film item E-220, frames 4276 through 4342. The 
object, believed to be a section of the SSME closeout blanket, 
appeared to originate near SSME #2, crossed the base heat, 
shield, passed behind the LH aft RCS stinger, reappeared near 
the LH OMS nozzle, moved aft along SS
	 #1, moved around the 
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SSME #1 nozzle, and finally fell aft of the Orbiter before 
being lost against the SRB plume. (Film items E-208, 213, 218, 
222; video items ET-204, 208, 212, TV-4A) 
Light-colored particles, believed to be pieces of aft skirt 
instafoam or small chunks of SRB propellant, fell out of the 
SRB plume during ascent (TV-4A). 
ET aft dome charring, plume recirculation, and SRB separation 
appeared normal.
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Initial SSME ignition and gimbal profile appeared nominal 
(top) . Numerous flashes and discolorations, possibly caused by 
contaminants, occurred in the SSME #2 Mach diamond during 
ignition (bottom).
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Orange streaks, typically caused by debris such as pieces of 
aft RCS paper covers, were visible on the edge of the SS} #1 
plume
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The SSME #2 closeout blanket was pulled loose or torn along the 
outer perimeter at the 11 o'clock position during SSME 
ignition. The separation was approximately 10 inches in length 
and occurred near the blanket splice. Post landing inspection 
revealed the outer layer of that ten inch section was missing. 
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A stud hang-up occurred on hoiddown post V. The stud pulled 
loose EPON shim material (arrows), three pieces adjacent to the 
stud hole, from the aft skirt foot. No ordnance fragments fell 
from the HDP #7 DCS/stud hole.
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A white object fell from the aft end of the Orbiter at T+43 
seconds MET. The object, believed to be a section of the SSME 
closeout blanket, appeared to originate between SSME #1 and #2, 
moved passed the SSME #1 nozzle (arrow), and fell aft of the 
vehicle.
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7.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
Review/analysis of on-orbit photography included seventeen 70mm 
still frames of the ET after separation from the Orbiter (DTQ-
312) and one 16mm motion picture film of payload deployment. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
Two light spots on the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange appeared to 
be possible divots 6-8 inches in diameter in the TPS closeout. 
The divots were located in the -Y-Z quadrant below the inter-
tank access door and were not a debris threat to the Orbiter. 
Bright spots on the LH2 tank acreage outboard of the -Y 
longeron and near the aft hard point were sanded repair areas. 
There were no apparent anomalies on L02 tank, LH2 tank, and aft 
dome TPS acreage. The BSM burn scars were typical. The 
nosecone, intertank access door, GH2 umbilical carrier plate, 
-Y ET/SRB fitting, and RSS antennae were in nominal configura-
tion. 
Detail on the +Y and +Z sides of the External Tank was not 
discernible due to shadows and underexposure of the film. 
Shortly after TDRSS/IUS deployment, a light-colored, curved 
object with a smooth concave side and rough, textured convex 
side appeared to originate from the aft end of the Orbiter and 
drifted over the left wing. Similar floating objects have been 
observed previously on STS-35 and STS-41. The most likely 
candidate for the object is solid, or frozen, oxygen dislodged 
from one of the SSME nozzles. The Main Propulsion System 
contains over 3800 pounds of residual oxygen at ET separation. 
Of this total, 270 pounds is vented through the SSME seal drain 
lines at the nozzle exit plane, 3400 pounds is dumped through 
the SSME nozzles, and the remainder is vented through the L02 
T-0 umbilical fill and drain valve. At a temperature below -360 
degrees F, the oxygen solidifies and accumulates on the SSME
 
nozzles. Photographs from previous missions show this ice 
adhering to the exit plane of the SSME nozzles. Transmitting a 
vibration through the Orbiter structure, such as the deployment 
of a payload, or melting from the sun, causes the ice to be 
dislodged from the SSME nozzles. 
84
'ç 
jl-
- A 
two 
... 
L	 b 
Tank after separation from the 
Orbiter shows no significant 
anomalies. The burn scar from 
BSM firing and charring on the 
L02 tank ogive from ascent 
aero heating are typical. 
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Shortly after TRDSS/IUS deployment, a light-colored, curved ob-
ject with a smooth concave side and rough, textured convex side 
appeared to originate from the aft end of the Orbiter. Similar 
floating objects have been observed previously on STS-35 and 
STS-41. The most likely candidate for the object is frozen 
oxygen that had adhered to one of the SSME nozzles during the 
MPS dump.
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7.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach was nominal. 
Five dark objects, possibly small pieces of black tile 
material, fell from the LH aft side of the Orbiter while 
crossing the runway threshold. 
Both main landing gear touched down almost simultaneously with 
the right side slightly ahead of the left gear. Touchdown of 
the nose gear was smooth. There were no vehicle anomalies or 
unusual control surface deflections during the rollout. 
No significant tile damage was visible on the Orbiter lower 
surface except for one site on the right side of the Orbiter 
nose below the forward RCS module. Frayed pieces of SSME 
closeout blankets flapped in the airflow from portions of all 
three SSE collars during the rollout. 
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8.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 4 August 1991 from 0945 to 
1130 hours. In general, the SRB's appeared to be in good condi-
tion. 
8.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RB frustum was missing no TPS but had 46 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was minor localized blistering of the Hypalon 
paint (Figure 9). The BSM covers were locked in the open posi-
tion, but the two LH covers were bent upward by parachute riser 
entanglement. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
forward of the ET/SRB attach point (Figure 10). 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Small K5NA cracks, approximately 
3/4 inch diameter, occurred on the center field joint pin band 
trunnion closeout at the 150 degree location and on the forward 
field joint near the Kevlar strap clip at the 312 degree loca-
tion. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork 
runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of the 
nozzle extension. Hypalon paint was missing from the aft field 
joint cork at the 0 degree location. The area was 4 feet long 
and covered the width of the cork closeout. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, and lEA appeared undamaged. Al]. three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage at 
approximately 110-120 degrees. The aft booster stiffener ring 
splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was 
missing. The aft dome factory joint weather seal debonded 
approximately 4 inches circumferentially at the 270 degree 
location (aft side). 
The phenolic material on the kick ring delaininated at only a 
few locations. Three K5NA protective domes were lost from bolt 
heads on the aft side of the phenolic kick ring near HDP #3 
prior to water impact. The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good 
condition (Figure 11). K5NA was missing from all of the aft BSM 
nozzles. Three of four HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) 
plungers were seated properly. The HDP #2 plunger was 
obstructed by a frangible nut half. This was the second flight 
utilizing the optimized link. All of the HDP #3 EPON shim 
material was intact. Most of the HDP #4 EPON shim material was 
lost at water impact except for a 5"x2.5" area, which showed a 
charred substrate.
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The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 46 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antenna phenolic plates were intact. Minor blistering of 
the Hypalon paint occurred forward of the ET/SRB attach point. 
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The Field Joint Protection System closeouts were generally in 
good condition. Hypalon paint was missing from the aft field 
joint cork at the 0 degree location. The area was 4 feet long 
and covered the width of the cork closeout. 
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Post flight condition of the RH aft booster. The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was in good condition.
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All of the HDP #3 EPON shim material was intact. Shim
material should remain attached to the aft skirt during flight. 
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Most of the HDP #4 EPON shim material was lost at water impact
except for a 5"x2.5" area, which showed a charred substrate. 
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The HDF #2 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible nut half 
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8.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LH frustum exhibited no missing TPS but had 38 MSA-2 
debonds over fasteners (Figure 12). Minor blistering of the 
Hypalon paint occurred at three locations. All BSM covers were 
locked in the fully opened position. 
The LH forward skirt exhibited no debonds. MSA-2, 2.5"xl" in 
size, was missing from an area one foot forward of the skirt 
clevis and one foot outboard of the +Z RSS antenna (aft of the 
flight door). The phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were 
intact. At least one layer of the phenolic plate on the +Z 
antenna was delaminated. The forward separation bolt and 
electrical cables appeared to have separated cleanly. No pins 
were missing from the frustum severance ring. Minor blistering 
of the Hypalon paint occurred forward of the ET/SRB attach 
point (Figure 13). 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were in good 
condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl 
cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of 
the nozzle extension. K5NA was missing from the center field 
joint closeout at the 150 degree location. The area, measuring 
4"x2.5"x3/8" deep, exhibited a clean substrate. The K5NA had 
failed along a bond line between layers. Hypalon paint was 
missing from the aft field joint cork at the 0 degree location. 
The area was three feet long and spanned both forward and aft 
Strips. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and aft booster stiffener rings 
appeared undamaged. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate 
closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring delaminated at several 
locations. One K5NA protective dome was lost from a bolt head 
on the aft side of the phenolic kick ring near HDP #5 prior to 
water impact. The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good condition 
(Figure 14). K5NA was missing from all aft BSM nozzles. 
All four HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were 
seated. This was the second flight utilizing the optimized 
link. The HDP #7 aft skirt bolt hole was broached along the 
hole edge closest to the centerline of the SPB. EPON shim 
material adjacent to the broached edge was missing. 
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The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 38 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners
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The left forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds. Minor 
blistering of Hypalon paint occurred forward of the ET/SRB 
attach point.
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The acreage MSA-2 on the LH forward skirt was generally in good 
condition except for a 2.5"xl" divot located one foot forward 
of the clevis and one foot outboard of the +Z RSS antenna (aft 
of the flight door).
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Post flight condition of the LH aft booster/aft skirt
The aft skirt acreage TPS was generally in good condition 
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The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were 
intact and no K5NA material was missing prior to water impact. 
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The HDP #7 aft skirt bolt hole was broached along the hole edge 
closest to the centerline of the SRB. EPON shim material 
adjacent to the broached edge was missing. 
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8.3 RECOVERED SBB DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 92 percent and 
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without 
HDP # Overall % 2 large halves % of Ordnance 
1 98 99+ 92 
2 31 34 27 
3 99 99+ 92 
4 99 99+ 94 
5 99 99+ 95 
6 99 99+ 92 
7 99 99+ 90* 
8 99 99+ 92
* A portion of booster cartridge was welded to the frangible 
nut half. The weight of this piece was included with the 
frangible nut. 
The new 'optimized' frangible links had been attached to the 
DCS plungers for this mission. The minimum allowable retention 
per NSTS-07700 is 90 percent. 
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 11. 
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9.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A detailed post landing inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was 
conducted on August 11 and 12, 1991, at the Kennedy Space 
Center on Runway 15 and in OPF Bay #2 to identify debris impact 
damage, and if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS 
sustained a total of 131 hits, of which 25 had a major dimen-
sion of one inch or greater. This total does not include the 
numerous damage sites on the base heat shield, which were 
attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and plume recirculation. 
The following table breaks down the STS-43 Orbiter debris 
damage by area:
Hits > or = 1"
	 Total Hits 
Lower Surface 24 122 
Upper Surface 0 2 
Right Side 0 2 
Left Side 1 5 
Right OMS Pod 0 0 
Left OMS Pod 0 0
TOTALS	 25	 131 
Runway 15 was inspected by SLF Operations and EG&G personnel on 
August 10-11, 1991, and potentially damaging debris was 
removed. The runway condition was determined to be acceptable. 
The post landing inspection of Runway 15 was performed 
approximately one half hour after landing. One piece of flight 
hardware was found on the runway beneath the L02 ET/Orbiter 
umbilical. A metallic U-shaped object, identified as a V072-
565471-001 yoke, originated from the L02 umbilical forward 
inboard separation bolt head. The yoke measured 2.75" x 1.0" x 
0.937". A 6" x 5" piece of tile, missing from the right main 
landing gear door outboard forward corner, was not found. 
The Orbiter lower surface had a total of 122 hits of which 24 
had a major dimension of one inch or greater. A comparison of 
these numbers to statistics from 29 previous missions of 
similar configuration (excluding missions STS-24, 25, 26, 26R, 
27R, and 30R which had damage from known debris sources), 
indicates both the total number of hits and the hits one inch 
or larger on the lower surface was greater than average. 
Figures 15 through 18 show the TPS damage locations for STS-43. 
The largest single damage site on the Orbiter lower surface 
occurred on the RH nose area below the forward RCS module and 
measured approximately 18" x 1" x 1/8" (spanned 6 tiles). This 
shallow hit is indicative of damage typically caused by low 
density material, such as ET SOFI. Post-separation ET 
photographs taken by the crew (DTO-312) showed only the 
-Y side 
of the tank and could not confirm the loss of ET TPS. 
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FIGURE 15. STS-43 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
3/4 X 314X112 
I X 3/4 2X1
11/4 X3/4 
3/8 DIA 
12 HITS, 4> 1
1/2 X 3/8 
1 
11/4X3/4 
5/8 DIA	
(2) 
S LI. 
3/8 DIA
'S 1/2 X 1/4  
3/4 DIA(2)-' 
1/4DIA(2)-
3/4X 1/4
5-
S 
1/2X 1/4 
518  1/4-	 .1 
S
1 X 3/8 
3/4X1/2 
1/2X1/4 
19 HITS, 7>1 
3/4 X 3/8 
1 1/4 X 1 
--- 6 X 5 (CORNER CHIPPEE 
3 X11/4 
4 X 3/8 
- 5/8 X 3/8 
5/8X1/4 
V 
S 
\. 
• / 	
1/2X1/4 
I TOTAL HITS 	 122 
S.
/
HITS >1 INCH = 24 
1 X 18 (6 TILES) 
1/2 X 3/8 
1 DIA 
-3/4X1/4	 EGGNC-O 
1/4 DIA
. 
1 1/2X3/4X1/8
S 
3/8 DIA - 
3/4 X 1/4 - 
1/2 X 1/2 -
111
FIGURE 16. STS-43 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 17. STS-43 
DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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FIGURE 18. STS-43 
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A cluster of 19 hits (with 7 larger than one inch) occurred 
just forward of the L02 ET/Orbiter umbilical. Similar clusters 
of hits have been observed in this area on previous flights and 
may be attributed to ice from the L02 feedline bellows or 
support brackets. A second cluster of 12 hits (with 4 larger 
than one inch) occurred just aft of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical 
cavity and may be attributed to ice from the L02 ET/ORB umbili-
cal during ET separation and/or damage from purge barrier 
baggie and ice during ascent. 
The ET/ORB separation ordnance device plungers were seated and 
appeared to have functioned properly. No ordnance fragments 
were missing other than the yoke from the L02 umbilical forward 
inboard separation bolt. The lightning protection contacts on 
both ET/Orbiter umbilicals were intact. No lightning protection 
contacts from the ET half of the umbilical were present. There 
appeared to be no significant heat intrusion past the thermal 
barriers around the ET doors. 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete 
runway. All main gear tires exhibited some minor material loss 
with most of the loss occurring on the LH inboard tire. 
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was average. The outer 
layer of SS #3 closeout blanket was peeled back along a 12 
inch length at 10:00 o'clock. Minor fraying occurred along a 12 
inch length at 9:00 o'clock. The outer layer of the SS #2 
closeout blanket was frayed along a 12 inch length at the 8 
o'clock location. SSME #1 closeout blanket was missing numerous 
layers of material from 4:00 to 7:00 o'clock (approximately 40 
inches in length) and may have been the white object observed 
in films falling aft of the Orbiter 43 seconds after launch. 
The overall condition of the TPS on the OMS pods was good. 
White streaks were present on the RH wing leading edge RCC 
panels and appeared similar to streaks observed after previous 
landings. 
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate to heavy hazing 
with a few small streaks. Windows #1, #2, #5, and #6 had light 
to moderate hazing with several small streaks. There was no 
evidence that the haze on the windows was the result of flight 
through volcanic ash. Figure 19 shows the sites on the Orbiter 
where samples were taken for laboratory analysis. 
A piece of thermal barrier approximately 8 inches in length was 
missing from the right side of the forward RCS module between 
thrusters F2R and F4D. The thermal barrier on the left side of 
the forward RCS module between thrusters F1L and F3D was frayed 
and a 4-inch section was protruding. 
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FIGURE 19. STS-43 
CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS 
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No tiles, carrier panels, or other TPS materials were missing 
from the Orbiter that would account for the debris object 
observed on-orbit after the TDRSS/IUS deployment. Frozen oxygen 
from the SSME area is the most likely explanation for that 
object. 
The Mikron infrared radiometer was used to measure the surface 
temperatures of several areas on the Orbiter. Eighty-four 
minutes after landing, the nosecap RCC was 113 degrees F, the 
RH wing leading edge RCC panel #9 was 92 degrees F, and the RH 
wing panel #17 was 91 degrees F (Figure 20). 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the 
number of hits with a major dimension of one inch or larger was 
near average as shown in the comparison charts (Figure 21-23) 
The distribution of hits on the Orbiter does not point to a 
single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding of ice 
and TPS debris from random sources. 
Orbiter Post Landing Anomalies are listed in Section 11. 
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FIGURE 21: POST FLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
> 1 INCH	 TOTAL 
STS-6 36 120 
STS-8 7 56 
STS-9 14 58 
STS-11 34 63 
STS-13 8 36 
STS-14 30 111 
STS .-17 36 154 
STS-19 20 87 
STS-20 28 81 
STS-23 46 152 
STS-27 33 141 
STS-28 17 111 SINCE RETURN TO FLIGHT 
STS-30 34 183 
STS-31 55 257 > 1 INCH TOTAL 
STS-32 39 193 
STS-29 23 132 23 132 
STS-28R 20 76 20 76 
STS-34 18 53 18 53 
STS-33R 21 118 21 118 
STS-32R 15 120 15 120 
STS-36 19 81 19 81 
STS-31R 14 63 14 63 
STS-41 16 76 16 76 
STS-38 8 81 8 81 
STS-35 17 147 17 147 
STS-37 10 113 10 113 
STS-39 16 238 16 238 
STS-40 25 197 25 197 
STS-43 25 131 25 131 
AVERAGE 23.6 118.2 17.6 116.1 
SIGMA 11.8 55.8 5.1 52.1
THIS ANALYSIS DOES NOT INCLUDE STS-24,25,26,26R, 27R, AND OR 
THESE MISSIONS HAD DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN SOURCES 
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OV-104 Atlantis made the 8th landing at the Kennedy Space 
Center on Runway 15 August 11, 1991 
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Overall view of OV-104 right side after landing 
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Overall view of OV-104 left side after landing
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Overall view of OV-104 nose/windows after landing 
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Overall view of SS's and base heat shield. Note missing tile 
fragment from base heat shield inboard of SS #3.
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The largest single tile damage site on the Orbiter lower 
surface occurred on the RH nose area below the forward RCS 
module and measured approximately 18" x 1" x 1/8" (spanned 6 
tiles) This shallow hit is indicative of damage typically 
caused by low density material, such as ET SOFI. 
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A cluster of 19 hits (with 7 larger than one inch) occurred 
just forward of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. 
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The separation 
ordnance device debris plunger in EO-3 was seated and appeared 
to have functioned properly. There was no significant heat 
intrusion past the ET door thermal barrier. 
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A metallic U-shaped object, identified as a V072-565471-001 
yoke, was found on the runway beneath the L02 ET/ORB umbilical 
and originated from the forward inboard umbilical separation 
bolt head.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The separation 
ordnance device debris plunger in EO-2 was seated and appeared 
to have functioned properly. There was no significant heat 
intrusion past the ET door thermal barrier. 
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Damage to the base heat shield tiles was average. The outer 
layer of SSME #3 closeout blanket was peeled back along a 12 
inch length at the 10:00 o'clock position. SSME #1 closeout 
blanket was missing numerous layers of material from the 4-7:00 
o'clock position and may have been the white object observed in 
films falling aft of the Orbiter 43 seconds after launch. 
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White streaks were present on the RH wing leading edge RCC 
panels and appeared similar to streaks observed after previous 
landings.
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate to heavy hazing 
with a few small streaks. The remaining windows had light to 
moderate hazing with several small streaks. 
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A piece of thermal barrier approximately 8 inches in length was 
missing from the right side of the forward RCS module between 
thrusters F2R and F4D.
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The thermal barrier on the left side of the forward RCS module 
between thrusters F1L and F3D was frayed and a 4 inch section 
was protruding.
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10.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of 12 samples were obtained from Orbiter OV-104 during 
the STS-43 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida (Figure 19). The 12 submitted samples consisted 
of 8 Orbiter window wipes (W1-8), 3 tile residue samples, and 1 
debris sample from the runway. The samples were analyzed by the 
NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material 
composition and comparison to known STS materials. The specific 
elemental analysis is shown in the appended MA.B report. Debris 
analysis involves the placing and correlating of particles with 
respect to composition, thermal (mission) effects, and 
availability. Debris sample results and analyses are listed by 
Orbiter location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis indicated the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallic particles 
2. RTV, glass fibers and insulation 
3. Cerium-rich materials 
4. Paint, rust and salt 
5. Organics 
6. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (aluminum, stainless and carbon 
steel) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust residue, but are 
not considered a debris concern in this quantity 
(micrometer) and have not generated a known debris 
effect. 
2. RTV, glass fibers and insulation originate from 
Orbiter TPS (thermal protection system). 
3. Cerium-rich material originates from Orbiter window 
polishing compounds. 
4. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; rust 
is an SRB/BSM exhaust residue; and salt is a naturally-
occurring landing site product. 
5. Organics were found to be cellulose, protein, sucrose, 
and nylon (adhesive/proteinaceous origin); urethane (as 
foam); and cellulose fibers (sample cloth origin). 
6. Earth compounds (Aluminum-Silica-Calcium rich material, 
calcite, alpha-quartz, Silica-Calcium rich material) 
are of landing site origin. 
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Orbiter Tile 
Results of the tile sample chemical analysis revealed the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. RTV, black and white silicon-rich tile 
2. Metallics and rust 
3. Organics and paint 
4. Salt and earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. RTV, black and white silicon-rich tile fibers originate 
from the Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS). 
2. Metallics and rust originate from SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue. 
3. Organics (cellulose, protein, sucrose, nylon) are of 
adhesive/proteinaceous origin, cellulose fibers are of 
sample cloth origin; paint is of flight hardware/GSE/ 
facility origin. 
4. Salt and earth compounds (aluminum-silica-calcium and 
silica-calcium rich materials) are of landing site 
origin. 
Debris from Runway 
Results of the runway debris sample analysis indicated the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. Orbiter TPS 
2. Metallics and rust 
3. Organics and paint 
4. Salt and earth compounds 
5. White film composed of silicone polymer (elastomer) 
with titanium dioxide and silicon dioxide 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Orbiter TPS materials (RTV, black and white tile, and 
insulation glass) originate from Orbiter TPS (thermal 
protection system). 
2. Metallics and rust originate from SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue.
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3. Organics (cellulose, protein, sucrose, nylon) are of 
adhesive/proteinaceous origin, cellulose fibers are of 
sample cloth origin; paint is of flight hardware/GSE/ 
facility origin. 
4. Salt and earth compounds (aluminum-silica-calcium and 
silica-calcium rich materials) are of landing site 
origin. 
5. White film appears to be paint, but not of known Space 
Shuttle Program/element origin. 
Conclusions 
The STS-43 mission sustained slightly greater than average 
Orbiter tile TPS damage. The chemical analysis results of post 
flight samples did not provide data that points to a single 
source of damaging debris. 
Samples from the Orbiter windows contained SRB/BSM exhaust 
residuals, Orbiter thermal protection system (TPS) materials, 
Orbiter window polishing compound residuals, paint and organic 
materials, and earth compounds. Also noted was the presence of 
urethane (as foam) whose source could not be resolved due to 
the small amount of the sample. 
The Orbiter tile sample results provided indications of thermal 
protection system (TPS) residual material. The variety and 
trace amounts of non-TPS material did not provide a single 
source debris anomaly. 
The sample recovered from the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) 
runway was found to be a "paint-like" film substance that did 
not resemble a known material in the Shuttle Program. The 
sample did indicate similar residual materials as detected in 
other post flight samples. Additional material testing will be 
performed to identify the source of this "paint-like" debris. 
The sample quantity for this mission (fewer than normal) was 
proportional to the residuals evident on the Orbiter. Also 
noteworthy was the commonality of material in the samples. 
These factors exponentially increase the difficulty of debris 
damage source evaluation.
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11.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, 10 Post Launch 
Anomalies, including one IFA candidate, were observed on the 
STS-43 mission. 
11.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. Typical damage to the facility included 1) four FSS level 
signs detached from the west side of the elevator shaft, 2) a 
panel detached between elevator doors on the 115' level, 3) 
cabinet doors were ajar and bent, 4) one cable tray cover was 
found 100 yards east of the pad, and 5) one of nine light 
fixtures from an east stadium light was detached and found east 
of the pad. (KSC Pad turnaround item) 
2. The MLP-1 deck southwest rainbird did not activate at T-0. 
No water was visible exiting the rainbird as the vehicle 
cleared the tower and SRB plume obscured the rainbird. (KSC Pad 
turnaround item) 
11.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. No items. 
11.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
1. Launch films confirmed a stud hang-up on HDP V. The stud 
pulled loose EPON shim material, three small pieces adjacent to, 
the stud hole, from the aft skirt foot. No ordnance .
 fragments 
fell from the HDP #7.DCS/stud hole. Post flight inspection 
revealed the HDP #7 stud hole was broached. (SRB project item) 
2. Three ordnance fragments fell from the HDP #2 DCS/stud hole 
shortly after liftoff (film item E-8). Post flight inspection 
revealed the HDP #2 DCS plunger was obstructed by a frangible 
nut half. One dark, thin object, possibly a frangible nut web 
or piece of firing cable, fell between the doghouse blast cover 
and the HDP #8 shoe (E-14). (SRB project item) 
3. The RB frustum was missing no TPS but had 46 MSA-2 debonds 
over fasteners. The LH frustum exhibited no missing TPS but had 
38 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. MSA-2, 2.5"xl" in size, was 
missing from the LH forward skirt near the +Z RSS antenna. (SRB 
project item) 
4. A 5"x2.5" piece of EPON shim material was missing from the 
HDP #4 aft skirt foot prior to water impact. The shim material 
should remain bonded during flight. (SRB project item) 
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11.4 ORBITER 
1. Tile surface coating material was lost from the aft face 
of the LH OMS pod near the OMS nozzle, the body flap +Z side, 
one location on the base heat shield near SSME #2, and two 
locations near the LH OMS nozzle. More coating material was 
lost from six locations near the RH OMS nozzle and two loca-
tions on the base heat shield near SS #3. Loss of the coating 
typically occurs during SSME ignition. (Orbiter project item) 
2. Numerous flashes and discolorations, possibly caused by 
contaminants or impurities, were visible in the SS
	
#2 Mach
diamond during ignition. (Orbiter project item) 
3. The SSME #1 closeout blanket was frayed and missing 
numerous layers of material at the 4-7 o'clock location. Film 
analysis showed a white object originating from an area between 
SS #1/#2 and falling aft of the Orbiter at T+43 seconds. The 
most likely candidate for the white object is a piece of the 
SS #1 closeout blanket. The larger-than-usual area of blanket 
damage and loss of the material early in flight is unusual. 
(Orbiter IFA candidate) 
4. A yoke from the L02 ET/ORB umbilical separation bolt head, 
part number V072-565471-001, was found on the runway beneath 
the L02 ET door. The metallic, U-shaped yoke measured 2.75" x 
1.0" x 0.937". The yoke should have remained in the debris 
container. (Orbiter project item) 
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APPENDIX A. 
MICROCHEMICAL ANALYSIS BRANCH

DM-MSL-1, ROOM 1274, O&C BUILDING
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ADDENDUM 
SUBJECT: Debris And Orbiter Residue Samples 
LABORATORY REQUEST NO: MCB-0609-91 ADDENDUM 
RELATED DOCUMENTATION: Intercenter Debris Team Requirements 
1.0 FOREWORD: 
1.1 REQUESTER: R. F. Speece/TV-MSD-22,/1-3635 
1.2 REQUESTER'S SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: The samples were from 
KSC SLF, OV-104, STS-43 landing KSC, and were identifiec 
as: 
I. Window Wipe 
1. window #1 
2. window #2 
3. window #3 
4. window #4 
5. window #5 
6. window #6 
7. window #7 
8. window #8 
II. Runway 
9. debris from runway, post-landing 
III. Tile Debris 
10. wipe from AFT of 5 tile hit 
11. black specs from 5 tile hit, 391016-255 
12. black specs 3911036-633 
1.3 REQUESTED: Perform material analysis and compare 
results to known STS materials. 
2.0 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS: 
2.1 Procedure: 
The samples were analyzed by means of optical microscopy 
(OM), infrared spectrometer (IRS), and electron 
microprobe with energy dispersive spectrometry (EDS). 
2.2 Results: 
2.2.1 The particulates were classified into components 
on the basis of color and texture by OM. The 
classified components from each sample are listed 
in Table 1 with elemental analysis. 
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Table 1 
Component 
ID
Elemental Analysis by EDS* 
Major Minor 
l.Metallics Fe,Cr,Al,Cu,Zn Ni 
2.Red rust Fe,Si,Cl,Ce,Al Ti,Ca,S,Mg,Zn 
3.Red rubbery Fe,Si 
4.Blkmtls Si,Fe,Cr,A1,P,S,C1 K,Zn,Al,Ca 
5.Blk rubbery Zn,Ca,Si,S,organics A1,Fe 
6.Grnmtls Ni,Si,Ca,S,Cl A1,Fe,Zn,Cr 
7.Yellow mtls Pb,S,Fe,Cr,Ti Al,Si 
8.Grey mtls Si,Al 
9.Wht mtls Na,Cl,Ti,Si,Ca,S organics,Fe,Al,Mg 
10 .Alpha-quartz Si 
ll.Blk dense tile Si 
12.Wht dense tile Si 
13.Blk spheres Fe 
14.Glass fibers Si,Al 
15 .Organics cellulose,protein,urethane, nylon, sucrose, 
ester 
16.Organic fiber cellulose fiber 
0, C, H, and B are not detectable by using this 
technique. 
2.2.2 Table 2 lists estimated amounts of each component 
versus sample number. 
Table 2 
Sample No 
Components 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.10.11.12. 
l.Metallics T T iT T 3 T x T T x x 
2.Redrust 10 2 8 T 3 T 1 T x 2 x x 
3.Redrubbery x x x T T x x x x x x x 
4.Bik mtls 20 12 18 8 6 8 8 10 10 10 x x 
5.Blkrubbery 8 1 x x x x x x x x x x 
6.Grnmtls 1 1 x x x T x x x x x x 
7.Yeiiowmtls x x T x x x x x x x x x 
8.Greymtls x 23 2 25 29 x x x x T x x 
9.Wht mtis 8 8 17 30 26 35 15 15 30 15 x x 
10.Alpha-quartz 15 5 8 8 10 15 8 30 5 x x x 
li.Blkdens tile x x x x x x x x x x 5 2 
12.Wht tile x x 5 x x x x x x 45 95 98 
13.Bikspheres x T T T T T T T T x x x 
14.Giass fibers T T T x x x T 1 x T x x 
15.Organics 37 48 41 29 26' 39 68 44 35 28 x x 
16.Organic fiber 1 . T T T T T T T 20 T x x 
Particle size 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- L L 
in urn 200 350 300 280 250 400 250 250 220 500
10: Estimated Volume Percent.
	 T: Trace. 
x: Not Detected.	 L: Large, <2000 urn 
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3.0 CONCLUSIONS: 
3.1 All samples contained small amounts of particulates and 
the particulates were composed of metallics, red 
materials, red rubbery materials, black materials, blac] 
rubbery materials, green materials, yellow materials, 
grey materials, white materials, alpha-quartz, black 
dense tile, white tile, black spheres, glass fibers, 
organics, and organic fibers. 
3.2 The following samples contained metallics 
1. Al-alloy, 300 series stainless steel, and brass 
2. Zn-metal, Al-alloy, and Ce-materials 
3. Al-alloy and Zn-alloy 
4. Al-alloy 
5. Al-alloy 
6. Al-alloy 
7. Al-alloy and 300 series stainless steel 
9. carbon steel 
10. Al-alloy and 300 series stainless steel 
3.3 The sample numbers 1 through 8 and 10 contained red rust 
and samples 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 contained Ce rich 
materials. 
3.4 The sample numbers 4 and 5 contained RW. 
3.5 The sample numbers 1 through 10 contained black 
materials. The black materials appeared to be composed 
of Si rich materials, Fe-rich materials, Al-Si-Ca rich 
materials, rust, and salt. 
3.6 The sample numbers 1 and 2 contained black rubbery 
materials. The black rubbery materials appeared to be 
composed of silicone or urethane. 
3.7 The sample numbers 1, 2, and 6 contained green materials 
The green materials were composed of Ni-Ca-S-Cl rich 
materials and Si-Ca rich materials. 
3.8 The sample number 3 contained yellow paint chips. 
3.9 The sample numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 contained grey 
materials. The grey materials were composed totally of 
Si-Al rich materials which could be a part of high 
temperature insulation. 
3.10 The sample numbers 1 through 10 contained white 
materials. The white materials appeared to be composed 
of Si-rich materials, calcite (CaCO 3 ), paints, and salts 
3.11 The sample numbers 1 through 9 contained alpha-quartz 
(alpha-S'02)-
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3.12 The sample numbers 11 and 12 contained black dense tile 
and white fibrous tile materials. 
3.13 The sample numbers 2 through 9 contained trace amounts of 
black carbon steel spheres. 
3.14 The sample numbers 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 10 contained Si-Al 
rich high temperature insulation type fibers. 
3.15-The sample numbers 1 through 10 contained organics. The 
organics were identified to be cellulose, protein, 
urethane, nylon, sucrose, and ester. 
3.16 The sample numbers 1 through 10 contained cellulose 
organic fibers. 
3.17 The particle sizes were estimated to be in the range of 1 
to 500 micrometers.
INVESTIGATOR: Y 
INVESTIGATOR:  
W. R. Carman 
APPROVED  
J. F. Jones 
146
NASA UCL	 Report Documentation Page 
SL.1ce ,nsI3l 
1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date 
Debris/Ice/TPS Assessment and Photographic
September 1991
 
Analysis for Shuttle Mission STS-43 6. Performing Organization Code 
7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. 
Gregory N. Katnik 
Scott A. Higginbotham  
James Bradley Davis 10. Work Unit No. 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
NASA 11. Contract or Grant No. 
External Tank Mechanical Systems Division 
Mail Code: TV-MSD-22  
Kennedy Space Center, Florida	 32899 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
15. Supplementary Notes 
16. Abstract
A Debris/Ice/TPS assessment and photographic analysis was conducted 
for Space Shuttle Mission STS-43. Debris inspections of the flight 
elements and launch pad were performed before and after launch.
	 Ice/ 
frost conditions on the External Tank were assessed by the use of 
computer programs, nomographs, and infrared scanner data during 
cryogenic loading of the vehicle followed by on-pad visual
	 inspection. 
High speed photography was analyzed after launch to identify ice/debris 
sources and evaluate potential
	 vehicle damage and/or in-flight 
anomalies. This report documents the debris/ice/TPS conditions and 
photographic analysis of Mission STS-43, and their overall
	 effect on 
the Space Shuttle Program. 
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 18. Distribution Statement 
STS-43	 Ice 
Frost	 Debris Publicly Available 
Thermal	 Protection System (TPS) Unclassified - Unlimited 
Photographic Analysis 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of pages 22. Price 
Unclassified Unclassified
NASA FORM 1626 OCT 86 
